Online debate “NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence - French and Polish Perspectives” [fr]

Program

(PDF - 635 kb)

It has gathered French and Polish experts as well as media consultants in order to exchange views on the main achievements since the Warsaw Summit, the characteristics of France’s involvement in the eFP and the ways to act together in response to a challenging security environment. The goal was to have particular look at the eFP’s influence on the transformation and modernization of our national armed forces and on our daily cooperation practices.

Why the eFP ? Some insights on the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit Dr Amélie Zima

The Warsaw summit happened in a tense situation due to the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and the war in the Ukrainian region of Donbass. Against this background, the Allies decided to launch the eFP (enhanced Forward Presence), which consists in four multinational rotating battlegroups located in the Baltic States and Poland. The consensus for this mission was reached for different reasons. For France, it is aligned with its policies in this region as the participation in the Baltic Air Policing mission. For Canada, it was mainly due to domestic pressures of nationals of Ukrainian or Central European descent. This decision also showed the influence of painful pasts in defense policies as it was not obvious for Germany to be a framework nation in the Baltic States due to the nazi invasion and occupation of that region during World War II. For the Eastern flank Allies, this decision ends a military imbalance within NATO, since their adhesions, there were “no nukes, no troops and no infrastructures” on their territories. Yet, the goal of the eFP is mainly symbolic. It has to deter and not to conduct a war and to show in the same time the solidarity of NATO and the validity of article 5, the collective defense guarantee. Regarding the NATO-Russia relation, the eFP does not infringe the 1997 Founding Act as it is on a rotating basis. Furthermore, the Founding Act is not a binding international treaty, and its principles, such as the respect of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all States, have been violated by Russia as proved by the Georgian and Ukrainian cases. However, the eFP has some gaps. Threats such as cyber, disinformation or security issues in the Baltic Sea are not considering and the interactions are mainly in a bilateral way, between the framework nation and the host nation, in each State, rather than in a genuine multilateral one.

“Chances for French and Polish cooperation on the eFP” – Dr Aleksander Olech

France and Poland have similar interests and are to be understood as very close allies for their goals and projects are quite aligned.

The military bases of the French Military are still focused on some specific regions of the world, such as Africa; and its presence in the Baltic countries for example is still limited. The French should perhaps pursue efforts to participate to missions in the eastern part of Europe; since with relatively small military outlays it can support the countries of central and Eastern Europe.

If the Eastern European countries are focusing their military actions on so many different fields, such as operation Barkhane, are we not abandoning the challenges on the Eastern European flanks ?

The involvement of Eastern European military, in this particular case Poland, in foreign missions is important if not crucial. Such deployment of troops allow for a stronger cooperation and the possibility to make the Polish army more effective, more experienced, and a global actor on the international stage. For the Polish army to be able to learn from the Chinese, Russian, American or French armies should be seen as an opportunity to grow and make bilateral and international agreements more effective.

“The significance of the French presence in the eFP” – Dr Wojciech Lorenz

Since 2017, France has deployed troops in Estonia and Lithuania. Moreover, France provides a large military support to Eastern European countries. As one of the most powerful military forces in the world, France could, and will play, a significant role in strengthening the Eastern European military readiness. Its capacity to mobilize an entire division with ease or to answer Russian movements and intimidation manoeuvers are things other Eastern European armies should learn from and enable the development of new military capabilities.

The situation as it is today is very different from the one during the Cold War. NATO needs to be able to address more diverse issues than simply the ones focusing on Russia. There is a need to find a consensus to strengthen the capabilities within NATO to tackle new types of threats such as the Mediterranean Sea, the challenges in Turkey, the military interventions in Irak ; there is a need to broaden the field of intervention and participation.

How, in practice, can Poland increase the attractiveness of this bilateral cooperation on the French side ?

Poland is attractive for France on two levels. First of all, it offers the French army the skills and training grounds of the Polish army, which are of high quality. The second is a common interest, shared by the two powers, in developing a multi domain doctrine at the NATO level. There is a great area of cooperation between France and Poland, the latter enabling the former to use trench, space, naval assets that France would have not found on its sovereign soil.

“Why the eFP? A Few Insights on the NATO Warsaw Summit” – Dr Marek Madej

Discussing Enhanced Forward Presence as a central, “flagship” initiative of NATO in its “back to basics” turn to collective defense function since 2014 no one could question its relevance. Definitely, on political and symbolic level EFP is a great manifestation of NATO adaptability, cohesion and determination – relatively quickly negotiated and elaborated by Allies, smoothly implemented soon after Warsaw summit in 2016 and then executed on sustained basis with wide participation of member states, cleverly overcoming – as a form of not permanent, but continuous rotational presence of international forces in the Eastern Flank - real or imagined obstacles and conditions created by NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, performed at moderate costs and well received by host states governments and, above all, societies. All that means that EFP is a well-designed, valuable project and even merely due to these advantages should be continued in this formula.

However, EFP should serve also more specific, operational goals. In context of deterrence and defense the most often mentioned is its “tripwire” function. Definitely, it could deter to some degree open, traditional aggression from Russia or delay aggressive forces advancements. However, as a conventional force deployment, EFP obviously is less effective in deterring non-conventional, hybrid methods of pressure, i.e. cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns. Due to its size, in case of open conflict EFP would also require quick and substantial reinforcements. So its military value should not be overestimated and it is advisable to supplement EFP with other initiatives, i.e. development of equipment stockpiles in host countries, more regular NATO air and naval forces deployment to the region, advancements in military mobility, as well as activities in cyberspace and information/counter-disinformation campaigns.

Undisputed value of EFP multinational units is its role in capability building and enhancing of interoperability of NATO forces, especially in relation with host-nation states. This task, however, not questioning its current value, could also be improved by better synchronization and coordination of functioning of all four battle groups deployed within the framework of the initiative, to supplement and enrich currently dominating “bilateral” model of cooperation of every battle group primarily with host-state nation.

“Future of NATO’s Eastern Flank” – Dr Beata Gorka-Winter

There are many new challenges facing NATO countries. First of all, Russia persists as a permanent threat in military and cyber warfare capacity. The pressure put on eastern European countries as such is a challenge for the whole alliance.

The European Union could also present some challenges for there is a risk from countries of not agreeing on troop deployment, which can also be a problem.

Outside Europe, we find numerous technological threats that require the development of technological abilities from the Eastern European powers to try and limit the possible impact of anticipated incoming attacks. The dependence on the United States is also problematic, and we cannot undermine that financial resources and manpower coming from the United States have been critical historically concerning military involvement. The American military is already overstretching its military capabilities and the new administration is unlikely to pursue the same goals as the previous one. NATO should be prepared to act more autonomously and be able to function with military effectiveness even with less support from the United States.

Afghanistan is a different field of fighting that Baltic states, do you see any lessons learned from our implication in such battlefield?

Most commanders say it was quite enlightening being able to partake in such military deployment. Apart from direct field work, the observation of other military involvement, strategies and manoeuvers were without doubt a great opportunity for the involved countries to learn from other global powers./.